From: Dr. Azzam S. Tamimi
This paper surveys the growth and various phases of and influences on the concept of democracy in the Islamic political thought of the last two centuries. Among the thinkers covered in the survey are Rifa'a Tahtawi (1801-73), Khairuddin at-Tunis (1810-99), Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1903), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Hasan al-Banna (1904-49), Ali Abd Ar-Raziq (1888-1966), Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), Sa'id Hawwa, and Malik Bennabi (1905-73). Reference is made to the influence of Sayyid Mawdudi (1903-79), on the thought of Sayyid Qutb. The paper traces also the bearing of Bennabi's thought on Rachid Ghannouchi and on the Islamic movements of our times.
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments. The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa'a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad, who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, in 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French, and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X. Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience: Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.
One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810-99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, in 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded. Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
Ghannouchi believes that neither Khairuddin nor any of the Islamic scholars of his time had intended to cast doubt on Islam or introduce changes to it. They only sought to understand Islam better and explore new means and methods to implement it, relying on the explanations of both ancient and contemporary scholars. They sought to legitimize borrowing from the West on the basis that ' . . . wisdom (or knowledge) is a believer's long-cherished objective', that ' . . . religion has been revealed for the benefit of the creation', and that ' . . . [the] Shari'a and the vital interests of the community are fully compatible'. To implement his reform plan, Khairuddin established the As-Sadiqiyah School for teaching modern arts and sciences within an Islamic framework. The purpose of the School, according to the founding declaration, was: 'To teach the Qur'an, writing and useful knowledge, i.e. juridical sciences, foreign languages, and the rational sciences that might be of use to Muslims being at the same time not contrary to the faith. The professors must inculcate in the students love of the faith by showing them its beauties and excellence, in telling them the deeds of the Prophet, the miracles accomplished by him, the virtues of the holy men . . .' Khairuddin At-Tunisi believed that ' . . . kindling the Umma's potential liberty through the adoption of sound administrative procedures and enabling it to have a say in political affairs, would put it on a faster track toward civilization, would limit the rule of despotism, and would stop the influx of European civilization that is sweeping everything along its path.'
In his search for the causes of decline in the Muslim world, Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani (1838-97) diagnosed that it was due to the absence of 'adl (justice) and shura (council) and non-adherence by the government to the constitution.
One of his main demands was that the people should be allowed to assume their political and social ryle by participating in governing through shura and elections. In an article entitled 'The Despotic Government', published in Misr on 14 February 1879, Al-Afghani attributed the decline to despotism which is the reason why thinkers in the Eastern (Muslim) countries could not enlighten the public about the essence and virtues of the 'republican government'. 'For those governed by it', he stresses, 'it is a source of happiness and pride'. He goes further, to insist that ' . . . those governed by a republican form of government, alone deserve to be called human; for a true human being is only subdued by a true law that is based on the foundations of justice and that is designed to govern man's moves, actions, transactions and relations with others in a manner that elevates him to the pinnacle of true happiness.' To Al-Afghani, a republican government is a 'restricted government' that is accountable to the public, and that is thus the antithesis of the absolutist one. It is a government that consults the governed, relieves them of the burdens laid upon them by despotic governments and lifts them from the state of decay to the first level of perfection.
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) believed that Islam's relationship with the modern age was the most crucial issue that Islamic communities needed to deal with. In an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideas with Western ones, he suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought corresponded to manfa'a (utility) in Western thought. Similarly, he equated shura with democracy and ijma' with consensus. Addressing the question of authority, Abduh denied the existence of a theocracy in Islam and insisted that the authority of the hakim (governor) or that of the qadi (judge) or that of the mufti, was civil. He strongly believed that ijtihad should be revived because ' . . . emerging priorities and problems, which are new to the Islamic thought, need to be addressed'. He was a proponent of the parliamentary system and defended pluralism, refuting claims that it would undermine the unity of the umma. He argued that European nations were not divided by it. 'The reason', he concludes, 'is that their objective is the same. What varies is the method they pursue toward accomplishing it'.
Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) wrote two books on the subject, Taba'i' Al- Istibdad (The Characteristics of Tyranny) and Umm Al-Qura (The Mother of Villages). The first is dedicated to defining despotism and explaining the various forms it may take, with much of the discussion focusing on political despotism. The relationship between religion and despotism and what he calls the 'inseparable tie' between politics and religion are also discussed. While stressing that Islam as a religion is not responsible for the forms of despotic government that have emerged and reigned in its name, Al-Kawakibi concludes that 'Allah, the omniwise, has intended nations to be responsible for the actions of those whom they choose to be governed by. When a nation fails in its duty, God causes it to be subdued by another nation that will govern it, just as happens in a court of law when a minor or an incompetent is put under the care of a curator. When, on the other hand, a nation matures and appreciates the value of liberty, it will restore its might; and this is only fair.' The entire book is an attempt to explain the reasons why the Muslim umma declined and became easy prey for 19th-century colonial powers. Like Al-Afghani and Abduh, Al-Kawakibi attributed the success of Western nations to ' . . . the adoption of logical and well-practised rules that have become social duties in these advanced nations which are not harmed by what appears to be a division into parties and groups, because such a division is only over the methods of applying the rules and not over them.' In his other book, Al-Kawakibi constructs a series of dialogues involving fictional characters whom he describes as thinkers each belonging to a known town in the Muslim world, all summoned to a conference organized in Makka (Umm al-Qura) during the pilgrimage (hajj) season to discuss the causes of decline of the Muslim umma. One character, Al-Baligh Al-Qudsi, says: 'It seems to me that the cause of tepidity is the change in the nature of Islamic politics. It was parliamentary and socialist, that is perfectly democratic. But due to the escalation of internal feuds, after the Guided ones (the first four Caliphs) it was transformed into a monarchy restrained by the basic rules of Shari'a, and then it became almost completely absolute.' Ar-Rumi says: 'The calamity has been our loss of liberty.' In conclusion, Al-Kawakibi stresses that progress is linked to accountability while regress is linked to despotism.
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) saw that the reason for the backwardness of the umma was that ' . . . the Muslims have lost the truth of their religion, and this has been encouraged by bad political rulers, for the true Islam involves two things, acceptance of the unity of God and consultation in matters of State, and despotic rulers have tried to make Muslims forget the second by encouraging them to abandon the first.' He stressed that the greatest lesson the people of the Orient can learn from Europeans is to know what government should be like. In his book Al-Khilafa (The Caliphate) he stresses that Islam is guidance, mercy and social-civic policy. About the latter, which he seems to use as a synonym for politics, he says: 'As for the social-civic policy, Islam has laid its foundations and set forth its rules, and has sanctioned the exertion of opinion and the pursuit of ijtihad in matters related to it because it changes with time and place and develops as architecture and all other aspects of knowledge develop. Its foundations include that authority belongs to the umma, that decision-making is through shura, that the government is a form of a republic, that the ruler is not favoured in a court of law to the layman - for he is only employed to implement Shari'a and public opinion, and that the purpose of this policy is to preserve religion and serve the interests of the public . . .'
Nineteenth-century Islamic political thinkers, who were clearly influenced by European democratic thought and practice, tried to establish a resemblance between democracy and the Islamic concept of shura. Faced with a crisis of government augmented by the autocracy and corrupt conduct of Muslim rulers, they sought to legitimize the borrowing of aspects of the Western model they believed were compatible with Islam and capable of resolving the crisis. However, the trend changed in the aftermath of the First World War and following the demise of the khilafa (Caliphate), whose abrogation, in 1924, shocked the Muslims in spite of the fact that many of them had suffered greatly at the hands of some Ottoman rulers. The khilafa was an administrative legacy that for many centuries represented a moral shield and a political entity. The challenge was no longer despotism. The Muslims had already lost their symbol of unity, which they had been trying to reform. The European democracies, which provided inspiration and were greatly admired by reformists in the East, had colonized much of the Arab world, dividing its territories among them as booties. The Western colonizers' endeavours to Westernize the Muslims was viewed as a serious threat to the Arab-Islamic identity, and, thus, liberating Muslim lands from colonialism became a priority. Hence, the call for reform was replaced by one for revival.
During this period, Rashid Rida, Abduh's disciple, published the Al-Manar Journal which attracted a readership of Islamic intellectuals who shared Rida's specific additions to the thoughts of his masters Al-Afghani and Abduh, namely the condemnation of innovations in doctrine and worship and the acceptance of the rights of reason and public welfare in matters of social morality. A young man who frequented Rida's circle and regularly read his Journal, then attempted to carry it on after Rida's death. His name was Hasan Al-Banna (1904-49). Trained by his father Ahmad Al-Banna, a graduate of Al-Azhar University and author of an encyclopaedia of Hadith and Islamic Jurisprudence, young Hasan grew up to become the founder of the largest and first international Islamic movement in modern times, the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood).
Established as a study circle, known as Madrasat at-Tahdhib (The School of Refinement), in 1928 in the Egyptian port city of Al-Isma'iliyya - the headquarters of the Suez Canal Company and the British forces in Egypt - the group grew rapidly and spread to other parts of the country within a short period of time. Its growth accelerated by the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the Arab Revolt in Palestine against the British Mandate and Zionist colonization, the movement quickly transformed itself into a political entity. By 1939 a series of rasa'il (messages or articles), mostly authored by Al-Banna, were circulated explaining the Ikhwan's mission, clarifying its ideas and underlining its method. In the first of these articles, entitled Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm (Between Yesterday and Today), Hasan Al-Banna diagnosed the situation in the Muslim world as follows:
European power expanded, thanks to discoveries, expeditions, and travels to far and distant lands as far as many of the remote Islamic countries like India, as well as some of the neighbouring Islamic provinces. Europe began to work earnestly at dismembering the powerful and far-flung Islamic state proposing numerous plans toward this end, referring to them at times as 'the Eastern question' and at others as 'dividing up the inheritance of the Sick Man of Europe'. Every state began to seize any opportunity as it arose, adopting the flimsiest of excuses to attack the peaceful yet careless Islamic state, and to reduce its periphery or demolish parts of its integral fabric. This onslaught continued over a long period of time, during which the Ottoman Empire was stripped of much of its Islamic territory which then fell under European domination, e.g., Morocco and North Africa. Many non-Islamic areas previously under Ottoman rule became independent during this time, e.g., Greece and the Balkan States. The final round of this struggle was the First World War, from 1914 to 1918, which ended in the defeat of Turkey and her allies, providing a perfect opportunity for the strongest nations of Europe, (England and France, and under their patronage, Italy). They laid their hands on the huge legacy left behind by the Islamic nations, imposing their rule over them under the various titles of occupation, colonialism, trusteeship or mandate dividing them up in the following manner: North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis) became French colonies lying in between a zone of international influence in Tangier and a Spanish colony in the Rif; Tripoli and Barca became Italian colonies in which Italy did not wish a single trace of Islam to remain. She forced Italian citizenship upon the people giving it the name of 'South Italy' and filling it with thousands of hungry families and wild beasts in human form (Italian outcasts); Egypt and the Sudan fell under English authority, neither one possessing a shred of independent authority; Palestine became an English colony, which England took the liberty of selling to the Jews so that they might establish therein a national Zionist homeland; Syria became a French colony; Iraq became an English colony; the Hijaz (the Western Province of Arabia) possessed a weak, unstable government dependent on charity and clinging to false treaties and worthless covenants; Yemen possessed an outmoded government and a poverty stricken populace exposed to attack anywhere and at any time; the remaining nations of the Arabian peninsula consisted of small emirates whose rulers lived under the wing of the British consuls and who fought one another for the crumbs falling from their tables, their breasts burning with mutual resentment and hatred. This was the case despite the reassuring promises and binding treaties drawn up by the Allies with the mightiest monarch of the Peninsula, King Hussein, stating that they would help him achieve the Arab independence and support the authority of the Arab Caliphate; Iran and Afghanistan possessed shaky governments beset by power hungry people on every side, they would be under the wing of one nation at one time and under that of another at other times; India was an English colony; Turkistan and the adjoining regions were Russian colonies, subjected to the bitter harshness of the Bolshevik authorities. Apart from these, there were also the Islamic minorities scattered across many countries, knowing no state to whose protection they might have recourse, nor any well armed government to defend their nationality, as, e.g., the Muslims in Ethiopia, China, the Balkans, and the lands of Central, South, East and West Africa. Under such conditions, Europe won in the political struggle, and finally accomplished her goal in dismembering the Islamic empire, annihilating the Islamic state and erasing it politically, from the list of powerful, living nations.
Al-Banna notes that as each of these nations struggled to regain its freedom and the right to exist as an independent entity, concepts of localized nationalism arose, and many states working towards this revival purposely ignored the idea of unity. From that moment the Muslim Brotherhood launched the struggle for the return of the Islamic empire as a unified state embracing the Muslims that had been scattered around the world, raising the banner of Islam and carrying its message. At this stage, the Europeans ceased to be a model. On the contrary, they were blamed for the ills of the Muslim umma. 'The Europeans', Hasan Al-Banna wrote:
. . . worked assiduously in trying to immerse (the world) in materialism, with its corrupting traits and murderous germs, to overwhelm those Muslim lands that their hands stretched out to . . . they were able to alter the basic principles of government, justice, and education, and infuse in the most powerful Islamic countries, their own peculiar political, judicial, and cultural systems. They imported their semi-naked women into these regions, together with their liquors, their theatres, their dance halls, their amusement arcades, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, their silly games, and their vices. Here they allowed for crimes intolerable in their own countries, and beautified this tumultuous world to the deluded, naive eyes of wealthy Muslims and those of rank and authority. This was not enough for them, so they built schools and scientific cultural institutes, casting doubt and heresy within the hearts of people. They taught them how to demean themselves, to vilify their religion and their homeland, to detach themselves from their beliefs, and to regard anything Western as sacred, in the belief that only that which is European can be emulated. These schools were restricted to the upper class, the ruling body, the powerful and the future leaders. Those who were unsuccessful in such places were sent abroad to complete their studies. This drastic, well organised social campaign was tremendously successful since it appealed to the mind. It will continue to exert its strong intellectual influence over a long period of time. Thus, it was far more dangerous than any political or military campaign. Some Islamic countries went overboard in their admiration for the European civilisation and their dissatisfaction with the Islamic one, to the point that Turkey declared itself a non-Islamic state, imitating the Europeans in everything that they did. Aman Allah Khan, King of Afghanistan, tried this, but the attempt cost him his throne. In Egypt the manifestations of this mimicry increased and became so serious that one of her intellectual leaders could openly say that the only path to progress was to adopt this civilisation: good or evil, bitter or sweet, praiseworthy or reprehensible. From Egypt it spread with strength and speed into the neighbouring countries, to the extent that it reached Morocco and encircled the holy sanctuaries within the midst of Hijaz.
Explaining that his movement's mission is one of reawakening and deliverance, Al-Banna declared that the goals of his organization were:
1. Freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, for this is a natural right belonging to every human being which only the unjust oppressor will deny.
2. The establishment of an Islamic state within this homeland, which acts according to the precepts of Islam, applies its social regulations, advocates its sound principles, and broadcasts its mission to all of mankind.
Al-Banna warned the Muslims, in general, and the members of his group, in particular: 'As long as this state does not emerge, every Muslim is sinning and Muslims are responsible before Allah the Almighty for their failure and slackness to establish it. In these bewildering circumstances, it is against the interests of humanity that a state advocating injustice and oppression should arise, while there should be no one at all working for the advent of a state founded on truth, justice, and peace. We want to accomplish these two goals in the Nile Valley and the Arab Kingdom, and in every land which Allah has blessed with the Islamic creed: uniting all the Muslims.'
The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood took a special interest in stressing that their movement was set up in response to the downfall of the khilafa. 'When the khilafa was brought down', Mustafa Mash-hoor, deputy leader of the Brotherhood explained: 'Imam Hasan Al-Banna rose up and proclaimed the restoration of the khilafa to be a religious duty incumbent upon every single Muslim man and woman.' In a message sent to the heads of Muslim states in June 1947, Hasan Al-Banna demanded that they shoulder their responsibilities and undertake the task of serving the umma. The task, he explained, consisted of two parts: the first, to rid the umma of its political shackles so as to achieve its freedom and restore its lost independence and sovereignty; and the second to rebuild the umma anew in order to pursue its path among nations and compete with others for the attainment of social perfection. Hence, Hasan Al-Banna's main concern was to mobilize the public against colonialism and its adverse effects on society. He called for the re- establishment of Islamic governance on three foundations: the ruler's accountability to Allah and to the public, the unity of the umma within a framework of brotherhood, and respect for the will of the umma and its right to check its rulers who are obliged to respect its will and opinions. In his analysis of the causes of European progress, he prognosticated the eventual collapse of Western civilization due to immorality, usury and political divisions.
In his message Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm (Between Yesterday and Today), he cites (political) parties as one of the factors that would lead to European decline. Although he stood for parliamentary elections twice, and while stressing that the parliamentary and constitutional system is in essence compatible with the Islamic system of government, he was adamant in his opposition to political parties. He regarded them as a potential threat to Islamic unity, which he deemed was essential for the re-establishment of the khilafa. 'They (political parties) are this homeland's greatest misdeed, the root of social corruption whose fire is scalding us. They are not genuine parties in the sense by which parties in any other country of the world are known. They are no more than a series of dissension caused by personal disagreements among a number of the children of this umma. Whose circumstances necessitated one day that they should speak in its name and demand its national rights . . . There is no more room for half solutions and there is no escape from the inevitability of the dissolution of all these parties. The forces of the umma ought to be joined in one party that would have to work for the restoration of its independence and freedom, and that would lay down the foundations for general domestic reform.' Between the two World Wars, thinkers affiliated with the liberal trend campaigned, like their 19th-century predecessors for total Westernization. Embracing secularism, they called for formulating modern constitutions and legal systems that, just as the Europeans had done, exclude religion and restrict its ryle to the private domain. They hoisted the slogan of 'separating state and religion' and blamed Islam for the backwardness of the Arabs.
The abolishment of the khilafa in 1924, aroused a debate among thinkers of the time over its importance. Ali Abd Ar-Raziq (1888-1966), an Al-Azhar graduate who later studied at Oxford, contributed to the debate with a book that turned out to be among the most controversial works in modern Islamic history. Abd Ar-Raziq's theory claimed there were no such things as Islamic political principles. He denied the existence of a political order in Islam and claimed that the Prophet never established one and that it was not part of his mission to found a state.
As Arab societies responded to the challenge of colonialism and rose to restrore their freedin and struggle for their independence, Westernized elites took over the leadership of national movements that originally had Islamic inclinations. Despotic single-party regimes or absolute monarchies replaced the colonial authorities in most of the Arab countries. Throughout the post-independence era, Islam, its culture and its heritage came under savage onslaught in the name of modernization. The Al-Azhar of Egypt was turned into a secular university, the Tunisian Az-Zaytouna Institute was closed down, awqaf (endowment) institutions were nationalized, Shari'a courts were either dissolved or marginalized and political parties and groups were banned or outlawed. The Ikhwan, who had already established branches or strong links in many Arab and Muslim countries, were hit hard by Nassir in Egypt soon after he came to power in 1952. Following the execution of several of their leaders and the imprisonment of hundreds of their followers in 1954, they were driven underground. The challenge had once again changed shape. It was no more the challenge and struggle for independence and freedom, but rather the struggle to resist and defend the umma against what was perceived as a pernicious onslaught against Islam and the cultural identity of the umma not only by foreign colonial powers but also by post-independence regimes. From then until the early seventies, members of the Islamic movement were influenced mainly by the works of Mawdudi and Nadwi and by the writings of Sayyid Qutb.
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), who was imprisoned for ten years in 1954 and then executed in 1966, became the leading ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood from the mid-fifties. His book Milestones, which was written in response to Nassir's persecution of the Ikhwan, acquired a wide acceptance throughout the Arab world after his execution and following the defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 War with Israel. In it, he put forward the thesis of jahiliyya (ignorance, barbarity or idolatry), from which Islam came to deliver the world. Qutb divided social systems into two categories: the order of Islam and the order of jahiliyya, which was decadent and ignorant, the type which had existed in Arabia before the Prophet Muhammad received the Word of God, when men revered not God but other men disguised as deities. Muslim society, according to him, was itself divided into two realms, that of Islam and that of jahiliyya. This was clearly expressed by Qutb in Milestones as follows: 'Jahiliyya is now present not only in the capitalist West and the Communist East, it has also infected the world of Islam. All that is around us is jahiliyya. Peoples' imaginings, their beliefs, customs, and traditions, the sources of their culture, their art and literature, their laws and statutes, much even of what we take to be Islamic culture, Islamic authorities, Islamic philosophy, Islamic thought: all this too is of the making of this jahiliyya.' Drawing from the theory of Mawdudi (1903-79) that as Islam has reverted to a state of jahiliyya, true Muslims find themselves in a state of war against the apostates, Sayyid Qutb concluded that true Muslims, the tali'a (vanguards), are and must be set apart within the ambient infidel society as a sort of 'counter-society'. In his trial statement, Sayyid Qutb declared: 'We are the ummah of the believers, living within a jahili society. Nothing relates us to state or to society and we owe no allegiance to either. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society.'
However, as far as democracy is concerned Qutb seemed to develop his own theory. In this he went much farther than Mawdudi, rejecting the concept altogether, denouncing it as alien, incompatible and jahili. The term hakimiyya (sovereignty), which Qutb constantly referred to while arguing against man-made political systems, was originally coined by Mawdudi, who used it to distinguish between Islamic and jahili (barbaric) societies. Mawdudi had argued that in a jahili situation, the edifice of politics rises on the foundations of al-hakimiyya al-bashariya (human sovereignty) whether such sovereignty rests in the hands of an individual, a family or a class or is the sovereignty of the public. 'Legislating in this kind of reign', Mawdudi explained, 'is entirely in the hands of man. All laws are made and replaced according to desires and to experimental interests. So is the case with political plans, which are only drawn or altered as dictated by the passion for utility and the provision of interests. In such a reign, no word is given precedence and no affair is awarded prevalence except if such were the functions of those who are most cunning, most resourceful and most capable of fabricating lies; those who have reached the pinnacle of deceit, cruelty and guilefulness; and those who have siezed full control and are recognised as leaders in their community where, in their ''laws'', falsehood becomes truth just because its proponents have power and have the ability to terrorise, and where, in their courts of law, truth becomes falsehood just because it has no supporter or defender.' In spite of all of this, Mawdudi still believed that Islam, by virtue of the institution of shura, was democratic. In spite of his reservations about the Western liberal democratic practice, he called for a chance to be given to democracy, one which would allow it to adapt and succeed in Muslim countries. Considering the task of reforming the system of government and administration to be part of the Muslim faith, Mawdudi suggested that the means of achieving such a reform would be to 'displace those who are corrupt and misguided from power and to replace them with those who are fit and righteous.' As to how this change could be achieved, Mawdudi stressed:
There is no other way in a democratic system except to participate in the battle of elections, that is by educating the public opinion in the country and changing the people's standard in electing their representatives. We should also reform the election mechanism and cleanse it from theft, deceit and forgery. By doing so, we would be in a position to hand power to righteous men, who are eager to develop the country on the pure basis of Islam.
When asked about the flaws in liberal democracy, he explained to his students that notwithstanding the flaws in any particular form of democracy, the principle that the masses have the right to choose, and to bring to account and replace their government, should always prevail. When asked which method for running the affairs of the people is principally correct, Mawdudi retorted: 'Should those who are in charge of the affairs of the people and who run them on their behalf be appointed by the free will of the people so that they only administer and govern through consultation, and after having obtained the consent of the people, and so that they only remain in power so long as they enjoy the confidence of the public? Or should one person, or a group of persons, impose themselves upon the people, take charge of their affairs and run such affairs according to their own whims, and whose appointment or dismissal, or whose running of the people's affairs, are beyond the will or control of those who are being run by them?'
He further explained that any flaws in democratic practice were due to three main reasons. The first, the assumption that the masses are the source of total power and absolute sovereignty, while in effect, and in any attempt to set up an absolute democracy in the world, the masses come under the control of, and suffer the hegemony, of very few individuals. Mawdudi suggested that Islam had a solution for this problem. 'Islam', he stressed, 'rectifies this flaw at the outset by imposing a siege on democracy derived from a basic law dictated by the Creator, Master and True Sovereign of this universe. This is a law that both the public and those in charge of administering its affairs are obliged to abide by. Thus, the question of absolute independence, which eventually causes democracy to fail, does not arise.'
The second and third reasons, Mawdudi argued, pertain to the standard of education and the degree of awareness of the electorate, or what he refers to as the masses. Here too, Islam provides an answer with its emphasis on educating the Muslims, ' . . . preparing them morally and calling on each of them to have a sense of responsibility'. For democracy to yield its fruits and proceed successfully, Mawdudi argued, that much would depend on the existence of a strong and vigilant public opinion. 'Such a public opinion', he explained, 'comes [in] to being when the community comprises righteous individuals who are entered in a social system that is established on [a] sound basis, [one] that is so vivid that evil and those who invite to it do not grow whereas good and those who invite to it do grow.'
Reaffirming that Islam may provide all the necessary rules and teachings for such guarantees to be maintained, Mawdudi expressed his conviction that once these guarantees are secured the apparatus of democracy might function successfully. 'It might also be possible', he added, 'that whenever a flaw appears somewhere in this apparatus, mending it would be provided for by a better apparatus. The mechanism of self-correcting, together with progress and development, would suffice for democracy to be given an opportunity and be experimented with, for it is possible through experimentation to develop any deficient apparatus until it become[s], step by step, perfectly sound.'
On the other hand, Qutb seems to have been completely opposed to any reconciliation with democracy. In the beginning, he was opposed to the idea of calling Islam democratic and even campaigned for a just dictatorship that would grant political liberties to the virtuous alone. In his tafsir (interpretation) of Sura al-Shura (Chapter 42 of the Qur'an) he said: 'Democracy is, as a form of government, already bankrupt in the West; why should it be imported to the Middle East?' Sayyid Qutb and his disciples, including Sa'id Hawwa of Syria and Dr. Abdulqadir Abu Faris of Jordan, in their treatment of the issue of democracy took an anti-Western position. Their discourses exhibit a lack of interest in the origin, nature or conditions of democracy or of its compatibility or incompatibility with Islamic values. In all discussions, the abstract democratic concept is confused with the attitude or policies of Western democracies toward the Arab world and Muslim issues. Their rejection of democracy was, understandably, a reaction.
Sa'id Hawwa initially wrote: 'Democracy is a Greek term which signifies sovereignty of the people; the people being the source of legitimacy. In other words it is the people that legislate and rule. In Islam the people do not govern themselves by laws they make on their own as in democracy. Rather, the people are governed by a regime and a set of laws imposed by God.' However, Hawwa seemed to adopt a more moderate position later in life, in fact just before his death, one much more reflective of the changing attitude of the mainstream Islamic movement. He wrote:
We see that democracy in the Muslim World will eventually produce victory for Islam. Thus, we warn ourselves and our brothers against fighting practical democracy. In fact, we see that asking for more democracy is the practical way to the success of Islam on Islam's territory. Our enemies have realised this fact, and that is why they have assassinated democracy and established dictatorships and other alternatives. Many of the followers of Islam have been unable to see the positive things democracy provides to us; they only looked at the issue from a purely theoretical and ideological perspective, and failed to look at it from the perspective of reality, namely that the majority rules, that the values of such a majority dominate and that in whichever country a Muslim majority exists Islam will prevail. Even when the Muslims are a minority, democracy is mostly in their interest.
In what amounted to a coup against his own previous stand and those of his mentor, Sa'id Hawwa seemed to campaign for, and encourage Islamists to adopt, the democratic alternative. He regretted that the Islamists have failed to benefit from the democratic circumstances that existed in many countries in the Muslim world, insisting that 'democracy in the Muslim World is the most appropriate climate for the success of Islam in the future.' Acknowledging the dilemma, he went on to say: 'The Islamists have fought democracy in the Muslim World because democracy in the Western concept has the right to make things halal (permissible) or haram (prohibited). It is a well established rule in Islam that no ijtihad (opinion) is allowed where a nass (sacred text) already exists. However, the problem here is that in the phase of conflict between Islam and other [ideologies] in the Islamic territory, we should know which system is better in order for the battle to be won by Islam.'
Hawwa's years of exile from the early 1980s until his death in the Jordanian capital, Amman, in 1988 represented an important transitional period in the thinking of the Mashriqi (eastern) Islamic school of thought away from the rejectionist thought of the earlier decade. The dramatic events of the early 1980s in Syria, particularly the military confrontation between the regime and some Islamist factions, as a consequence of which the government declared an all-out war against all forms of Islamic activity coupled with the destruction of the city of Hama and the wiping out of the organized edifice of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country, had profound and long-term effects on Islamic movements throughout the region. Ironically, it was the leaders and intellectuals of the severely bruised Syrian Islamic Movement that led the trend. The violent means of change had proven disastrous and the radical reform approach was a complete failure.
It was thanks to Hawwa himself, and those who shared his insight, that this transition took place. Criticizing those Islamic writers who stood adamantly against the democratic process, he wrote: 'Undoubtedly, democracy is the most favourable environment in the Muslim world for the battle to be won by Islam. Nevertheless, some people have been found in the Muslim world to fight democracy. The alternative has been military dictatorships and [single] party dictatorships that kept all the ills and prejudices of the Western democracy against Islam and the Islamists and denied Islam and the Islamists the freedom of passage. Democracy, wherever it exists in the Muslim world, means that eventually Islam and the Islamists will win and achieve their objective[s].' Then as if reminding his readers, who at the time were mostly members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in the countries of the Middle East, Hawwa hailed the decision once made by the founder of the movement, Hasan Al-Banna, to participate in parliamentary elections. This was, as admitted by many pro-democracy Islamists, a very significant event in the history of the Islamic movement that for much of the 1960s and the 1970s nobody seemed, or probably wanted, to remember.
Hawwa wrote: 'Al-Banna was wise when he wanted to participate in the parliamentary life, and Al-Hudaybi was wise when he called for the revival of the parliamentary life in Egypt.' Then as if to distinguish between two different trends within the ranks of Islamism, Hawwa declared: 'Participating in the elections to benefit from the democratic life has become a common denominator among the genuine Islamic movements, and thus we ought to be brave and frank in declaring that we do not fear [the emergence of] democracy in the Muslim world but fear for it.' Hawwa went so far as to remind the Islamists that they would be committing suicide by rejecting democracy: 'Because they fought democracy and viewed it through its [literal] meaning rather than its implications, the Islamists have killed themselves. Consequently, they have been governed by the worst regimes, that have imposed on them what they had feared from democracy; they have been denied the freedom democracy grants to them.' Then he asked: 'How could the Islamists fear democracy, the fear of which only leads to usurping them their freedom and to the rule of the minority? They should instead fear for democracy. The human experience has thus far shown that there can be no alternative to democracy other than revolutions, minority conspiracies and violence. All of this is a much greater risk than giving everybody the freedom to choose so that the majority elects those whom it deems fit and capable.' It is, however, clear that Hawwa did not think of democracy as an end in itself, but as a means to what he believed to be the most noble end, namely the implementation of Islam. 'Experience has proven that, in the Islamic ummah, democracy is the lesser of the two evils and the more moderate of the two damages prior to reaching the state of Islamic government.'
In the meantime, a different school of thought was developing in the Arab Maghreb drawing its inspiration from the 19th-century reform movement of Khairuddin at-Tunisi and the ideas of 'Abduh (who had twice visited Tunis and had a number of associates there), Bin Badis, Ath-Tha'alibi, Al-Taher al-Haddad, 'Allal Al-Fasi and others. Malik Bennabi, however, is credited with having laid the foundations of this modern Maghreb school of thought. An Algerian thinker of French culture, Bennabi (1905-73) believed that the coming of Europe had enabled the Muslims to escape from their decadence - caused by the emergence of a type of mind incapable of thought and afflicted with moral paralysis - by breaking up their rigid social order and freeing them from belief in occult forces and fantasies. From the early 1950s until his death, he wrote and lectured on what he believed to be the grand issues: namely, civilization, culture, concepts, orientalism and democracy. In a lecture entitled 'Democracy in Islam' delivered in French at the Maghreb Students Club in 1960 - attended then by Rachid Al-Ghannouchi and later on co-translated into Arabic by him - Bennabi attempted to answer the question 'Is there democracy in Islam?' He pointed out that defining the concepts of 'Islam' and 'democracy' in a conventional manner would lead to the conclusion that, with respect to time and location, the connection between the two is non-existent. He suggested that deconstructing the concepts in isolation from their historical connotations and re-defining democracy in its broadest terms, without linguistic derivatives and free from any ideological implications, would lead to a different conclusion.
'Democracy', he said, 'ought to be looked at from three angles: democracy as a sentiment toward the ego, democracy as a sentiment toward the other, and democracy as the combination of the socio-political conditions necessary for the formation and development of such sentiments in the individual.' He went on to say: 'Contrary to the depiction of the romantic philosophy of the era of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, these conditions are not created by nature, nor are they the requisites of natural law, but are the upshot of a specific culture, the crowning of the progress of the humanities and a new appraisal of the value of man; his appraisal of himself and his appraisal of others. Thus, the democratic sentiment is the product of this progress over the centuries and of this twin appreciation of the value of man.'
Citing the French historian Guizot, in his book Europe from the End of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution, Bennabi stressed that various stages of progress led to the emergence of democracy in Europe and to the growth of the democratic sentiment in the European countries. He said: 'The great historian explains to us how remote and simple the origins of Western democracy had been before the democratic sentiment slowly formed prior to bursting with the declaration of human rights and citizen rights; the declaration which expressed the new appraisal of man and the legendary and political crowning of the French Revolution. Thus, the European democratic sentiment began to express itself - though not yet ridden of the obscurity that accompanies an object while in the state of making or evolving - through the two grand historical movements, the movement of reform and the movement of renaissance.' Bennabi considers the two movements to be the first expression of the value of the European human in the domain of the soul and in the domain of the mind. He stresses that this is the essence of the Western democratic sentiment when ridden of the fetters of history and politics - since the obscurity is caused by a package composed of phenomena and characteristics peculiar to Western history and which are not found in the history of other races and peoples - and when things are expressed in the terms of psychology and sociology. In other words, the democratic sentiment in Europe was, according to Bennabi, the product and natural outcome of the reform and renaissance movements. 'This', he stresses, 'is its correct historical meaning, and therefore it cannot simply be severed from the history of Europe so as to be applied to other nations.' However, he reiterates that whether in Europe or anywhere else, the general rule with regard to the nature of the democratic sentiment is that it is the outcome of a specific social continuity. 'In psychological terms', he adds, 'it is the middle position between two ends that are opposed to each other; the end that expresses the psyche of the oppressed slave on the one hand and the end that expresses the psyche of the oppressive master on the other. The free man, or the new man, in whom the values and conditions of democracy are embodied is the positive co-ordinate that is the sum of two negatives that individually negate all such values and conditions: the negative of servitude and the negative of enslavement.'
As for the question of the existence of democracy within Islam, Bennabi argues that this is dependent on the provision of what he earlier refers to as the general conditions of the democratic sentiment. He then puts forward a set of questions: Does Islam provide and guarantee these objective and subjective conditions, in the sense that it creates a sentiment toward the 'ego' and toward the 'other' that is compatible with the democratic sentiment? And does it create the appropriate social circumstances for the development of such a sentiment? Does Islam truly reduce the quantity and intensity of the negative motives and of the anti-democratic tendencies that characterize the conduct of the oppressed and the conduct of the oppressor? He suggests that any project aimed at founding a democracy should be considered an educational enterprise for the whole community, administered through the implementation of a comprehensive curriculum that encompasses psychological, ethical, social and political aspects. 'Democracy', he asserts, 'is not - as is superficially understood by the common usage of its etymology - a mere political process; a process whereby powers are handed over to the masses . . . But is the generation of a sentiment, and of objective and subjective responses and standards, that collectively lay the foundations upon which democracy, prior to being stated in any constitution, stands in the conscience of the people. The constitution is usually nothing but the formal outcome of the democratic enterprise once transformed into a political reality indicated by a text that is inspired by customs and traditions, and dictated by a sentiment generated in a given circumstance. Such a text will have no meaning if not preceded by the customs and traditions that inspire it, or in other words the historical justifications that necessitate it.' He then warns that the answer to the question 'Is there democracy within Islam?' is not necessarily pertinent to a fiqh (jurisprudence) rule deduced from the Sunna or the Qur'an, but is one which is related to the essence of Islam as a whole. 'In this sense', he argues, 'Islam should be viewed not as a constitution that proclaims the sovereignty of a given community, or that states the rights or liberties of a certain people, but as a democratic enterprise that is the product of an exercise, through which the position of a Muslim vis-a-vis his or her encompassing society is defined, along the path toward accomplishing democratic values and norms provided a Muslim's temporal activity is tied to the general principles endorsed by Islam in the form of a seed sown in the Islamic conscience, and in the form of a general sentiment, and of motives, that constitute the Islamic equilibrium within every member of the community.'
Speaking of models of democracy - 'Western' in Europe, 'popular' in the East and 'new' in China - that differ from one another in the way they express their new symbolic evaluation of man, Bennabi sees that an Islamic model of democracy is attainable. Whereas in the other models the main objective is to endow man with political rights, enjoyed by the 'citizen' in Western countries, or social securities, enjoyed by the 'comrade' in Eastern countries, 'Islam', is distinguishable, according to Bennabi, because it 'endows man with a value that surpasses every political or social value'. He explains that the declaration in the Qur'anic verse 70 of Chapter 17, (We have honoured the children of Adam), endows man with more than just rights or securities. 'This verse was revealed as if to lay the foundations for a democratic model that is above every other model, where the divine element within man is taken into consideration and not just the human or social aspects as in the other models. Thus, a kind of sanctity is endowed upon man raising his value above whatever value other models give to him.'
However, Bennabi is keen to distinguish between what Islam has the potential to offer and the prevalent state of the Muslims. He concludes that democracy exists within Islam, not during the era when Islamic traditions petrify and lose their brilliancy such as nowadays, but during the era of their making and when society is developing, such as during the first 40 years of Islamic history.
Bennabi's analysis was revolutionary during his time, when Islamists in much of the Arab world, especially in the Middle East, were influenced by Qutb's thoughts and made an enemy out of democracy without ever understanding it. It was primarily thanks to his disciples such as Rachid Ghannouchi and other North African thinkers that mainstream Islamic movements gradually, though sometimes reluctantly, relinquished old positions on this matter. Malik Bennabi, who according to Ghannouchi, 'undoubtedly represents an element of the Islamic culture of rationalism and particularly a revival of Ibn Khaldun's historical culture of rationalism', had a profound influence on the Tunisian Islamic group. The two men's first encounter came when, on his way back from Paris to Tunis, Ghannouchi travelled by land through Spain, Morocco and Algeria where he visited Bennabi before entering Tunisia. He had read his books in Damascus when he, as he put it, returned to Islam. Having read Sayyid Qutb during his student years in Syria and France, and having been greatly influenced by his thoughts during that initial period of self- searching, he listened attentively to Bennabi as he strongly criticized Qutb. The latter had actually referred to Bennabi in one of his writings without mentioning his name: 'An Algerian writer who writes on Islam believes that Islam is one thing and civilisation is another.' Bennabi was seemingly offended by Qutb's remark which he believed was demeaning. After listening to the critique, Ghannouchi concluded that Bennabi had deeper knowledge and a better understanding of civilization than Qutb. Bennabi believed that 'whereas civilisation is the transformation of any good idea into a reality, Islam is a set of guidelines, a way of life, or a project, that creates a civilisation only when put into practice; when its adherents carry it and move through the world positively influencing man, material and time. Therefore, a Muslim may be uncivilised just as a non-Muslim may be civilised.' On the other hand, Qutb insisted that civility is a synonym of Islam; that a Muslim is civilized and a non-Muslim is not. 'This belief', Ghannouchi comments, 'would inevitably lead to takfir' (that is charging someone with unbelief), and goes on to say, 'Qutb seemed to have borrowed the belief of the Al-Khawarij that a person is not a Muslim unless he or she is sinless and applied it to the question of civility; that is a person is not a Muslim unless he is perfectly civilised, and therefore all those backward Muslims are infidels!'
1. Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, Paper entitled 'The Development of the Concepts of Democracy in the Modern Arab Thought', in The Crisis of Democracy in the Arab Homeland (Arabic reference), p. 115 (Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Centre, 1984).
2. Rifa'a At-Tahtawi (1801-73) was the first to campaign for interaction with the European civilization with the objective of borrowing from it that which does not conflict with the established values and principles of the Islamic Shari'a. A graduate of Al-Azhar, the well-known Islamic university in Cairo, he was appointed as an Imam to the Egyptian regiment that was dispatched by Muhammad Ali to France. Although sent there as an Imam and not as a student, and as a descendant of an ancient family with a strong tradition of Islamic knowledge, he threw himself into study with enthusiasm. He acquired a precise knowledge of the French language and read books on ancient history, Greek philosophy and mythology, geography, mathematics and logic and, most importantly, the French thought of the 18th century - Voltaire, Rousseau's Contrat Social (Social Contract) and other works. Returning home after five years, he diagnosed the illness of the umma (community) as being due to lack of freedom and suggested multi-party democracy as a remedy. At-Tahtawi criticized those who opposed the idea of taking knowledge from Europe, saying: 'Such people are deluded; for civilizations are turns and phases. These sciences were once Islamic when we were at the apex of our civilization. Europe took them from us and developed them further. It is now our duty to learn from them just as they learned from our ancestors.' A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 69, and R. S. Ahmad, Ad-Din Wa'd-Dawla Wath-Thawra (Religion, State and Revolution), (Al-Dar Al-Sharkiyah, 1989), p. 34.
3. Ibid., p. 121, quoting Lewis Awad's The History of Modern Egyptian Thought (Arabic reference).
4. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age
1798-1939, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
5. Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, op. cit., p. 121.
6. Faruq Abdessalam, Al-Ahzab As-Siyasiyya fi'l-Islam
(Cairo: Qalyoob Publishing House, 1978).
7. Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, op. cit., pp. 122-3.
8. Rachid Ghannouchi, 'The Conflict Between the West and Islam, The Tunisian Case: Reality and Prospects', a Lecture at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 9 May 1995, translated by Azzam Tamimi.
9. Charles A. Micaub, Leon Carl Brown and Clement Henry Moore, Tunis, the Politics of Modernisation (London: Pall Mall Press), p. 10.
10. Khairuddin At-Tunisi, Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al-Mamalik
(Tunis, 1972), p. 185.
11. Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, op. cit., p. 123.
12. R. S. Ahmad, Ad-Din Wa'd-Dawla Wath-Thawra,
op. cit., pp. 44-7.
13. Abdulbasit Hasan, Jamal Ad-Din Al-Afghani (Cairo, 1982),
15. R. S. Ahmad, Ad-Din Wa'd-Dawlah Wath-Thawrah,
op. cit., pp. 44-7.
16. Faruq Abdessalam, Al-Ahzab As-Siyasiyyah fi'l-Islam,
op. cit., p. 28.
17. Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi, Taba'i' al-Istibdad
(Algiers: Mofam Publications, 1988), p. 187.
18. Ibid., p. 169.
19. Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi, Umm al-Qura (Beirut: Dar Ash-Shuruq Al-Arabi, 1991). See also Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, op. cit., p. 124.
20. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939,
op. cit., p. 228.
21. Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, op. cit., pp. 124-5.
22. M. Rashid Rida, Al-Khalifah
(Cairo: Az-Zahra Publications, 1988), p. 9.
23. M. Fathi Othman, Min Usul al-fikr As-Siyasi (Of the Fundamentals of Islamic Political Thought), (Beirut: Ar-Risala, 1984), p. 48.
24. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, op. cit., p. 360.
25. 25. Hasan Al-Banna, Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm (Between Yesterday and Today), Arabic reference (Beirut: Ar-Risalah, n.d.), p. 226.
26. Ibid., pp. 238-40.
27. Ibid., p. 240.
28. Ibid., p. 241.
29. Ibid., pp. 245-7.
30. Ibid., p. 250.
31. Ibid., p. 251.
32. Mustafa Mash-hoor, a public talk in Arabic at the Muslim Welfare House in London, 26 May 1995.
33. Hasan Al-Banna, Nahwa An-Nur (The Complete Works) Arabic reference (Beirut: Ar-Risalah, n.d.), p. 185.
34. Hasan Al-Banna, Mushkilatuna (Our Problems), in: Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam Hasan al-Banna (Cairo: Dar al-Shabab, [n.d.]), pp. 389-93.
35. Hasan Al-Banna, Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm, op. cit., p. 245.
36. Hasan Al-Banna, Mushkilatuna, op. cit., pp. 405-7.
37. Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, op. cit., p. 137.
38. M. Al-Bahiyy, Al-fikr al-Islami al-Hadith wa Silatuhu Bi' l-Isti'mar al-Gharbi ([n.p.], 1991), pp. 206-9.
39. Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford, 1992),
40. Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism (London, 1989), p. 67.
41. Elie Kedourie, op. cit., p. 332.
42. E. Sivan, Radical Islam, Medieval Theology and Modern Politics
(Yale, 1985), p. 85.
43. A. Mawdudi, Al-Islam Wa' l-Jahiliyya, 2nd Ed. (Dar At-Turath Al-Arabi, 1980), pp. 14-15.
44. A. Mawdudi, Al-Islam Fi Muwajahat At-Tahaddiyyat Al-Mu'asira (Islam in the Face of Contemporary Challenges). Trans. by Khalil Al-Hamidi (Kuwait: Dar Al-Qalam, 1971), pp. 249-52.
45. A. Mawdudi, Waqi' Al-Muslimin Wa Sabil An-Nuhudi Bihim,
3rd Ed. (Beirut: Ar- Risala, 1978), p. 187.
46. Ibid., p. 188.
47. A. Mawdudi, Al-Islam Fi Muwajahat At-Tahaddiyyat
Al-Mu'asira, op. cit., p. 250.
48. Ibid., p. 251.
50. Ibid., pp. 251-2.
51. Ibid., p. 252.
52. E. Sivan, Radical Islam, Medieval Theology and Modern
Politics, op. cit., p. 73.
53. Sa'id Hawwa, Jundu Allahi Takhtitan
(Beirut: Dar Ammar, 1988), p. 71.
54. Ibid., pp. 104-5.
55. Ibid., p. 105.
56. The second Murshid (or leader) of the Muslim Brotherhood,
57. Sa'id Hawwa, Jundu Allahi Takhtitan, op. cit., p. 105.
59. Ibid., p. 106.
60. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939,
op. cit., p. 371.
61. Ibid., pp. 372-3.
62. Malik Bennabi, Al-Qadaya Al-Kubra (The Grand Issues),
(Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1991).
63. Ibid., pp. 133-40.
64. Ibid., pp. 144-5.
65. Ibid., p. 146.
66. Ibid., p. 150.
67. Interview with the researcher, London, June 1995.
68. Malik Bennabi, Al-Qadaya Al-Kubra, op. cit.
Interview with the researcher, London, June 1995.